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Associational Standing for Organizations
with Internal Conflicts of Interest
Nathaniel B. Edmondsj'
The judicial theory of associational standing allows an organiza-
tion to sue on behalf of an injury to one or more of its members.' Al-
though this mode of representation provides for greater and more ef-
fective access to the courts because of the greater financial resources
and expertise of an organization,2 associational standing can also cre-
ate significant difficulties when not all members of the organization
support the litigation, thus creating an internal conflict of interest.3 A
frequent example in the case law occurs when a business association
attempts to overturn a statute providing contracting advantages to
minority-owned businesses. The business association has members
who would be hurt by successful litigation (minority-owned busi-
nesses) and members who would be helped by successful litigation
(non-minority-owned businesses).' Courts split over how to handle an
organization that is litigating on behalf of some of its members and to
the detriment of others.6 Specifically, some courts have found that or-
t A.B. 1995, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 2002,The University of Chicago.
1 See James vm. Moore, 15 Moore's Federal Practice § 101.60 at 101-97 to 101-102.2 (Mat-
thew Bender 3d ed 2001) (discussing the application of the associational standing doctrine).
2 See International Union, United Automobile; Aerospace; and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America v Brock, 477 US 274, 289-90 (1986) (noting that associations "can draw
upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital").
3 See, for example, Maryland Highways Contractors Association, Inc v Maryland, 933 F2d
1246, 1252-53 (4th Cir 1991) (denying standing due to conflicts between members who would
benefit from successful litigation and members who would be hurt by successful litigation).
Courts have denied standing because of internal conflicts of interest in three main types of cases:
(1) business associations challenging regulations favoring one segment of the membership, see,
for example, Maryland Minority Contractors Association, Inc v Maryland Stadium Authority, 70 F
Supp 2d 580 (D Md 1998); (2) unions challenging awards of contracts or settlement negotiations
that aid a subset of the membership, see, for example, National Maritime Union of America,
AFL-CIO v Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F2d 1228 (DC Cir 1987); and
(3) business associations seeking equitable relief in antitrust actions that could harm individual
members, see, for example, NCAA v Califano, 622 F2d 1382 (10th Cir 1980). Courts have occa-
sionally examined other conflicts of interest, such as when corporate management seeks to rep-
resent the rights of shareholdes or when special-interest organizations seek redress for indirect
economic effects. See, for example, Polaroid Corp v Disney, 862 F2d 987,997-1002 (3d Cir 1988).. 4 See, for example, Maryland Highways Contractors, 933 F2d at 1252-53 (denying a con-
tractors' association standing to overturn a statute that provided advantages to minority-owned
businesses because not all of the association's members were minority-owned businesses).
5 See, for example, id.
6 See Sea Shore Corp v Sullivan, 158 F3d 51,56 n 7 (1st Cir 1998) (noting a split in the cir-
cuits); Retired Chicago Police Association v City of Chicago, 7 F3d 584, 603-07 (7th Cir 1993)
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ganizations with internal conflicts of interest may have associational
standing while others have denied standing under similar circum-
stances.
In Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,7 the
Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine whether an
organization can assert associational standing on behalf of its mem-
bers:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its mem-
bers when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue
in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are ger-
mane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim as-
serted nor the relief requested requires the participation of indi-
vidual members in the lawsuit.8
Although this test appears simple and forthright, the Supreme
Court has never fully explained the reasoning underlying any of the
prongs nor applied the test to an organization with an internal conflict
of interest
Consequently, lower courts have divided not only over how to
apply the test, but also over which prong should be the focus of the
analysis.' Some lower courts have found that certain types of "pro-
found" conflicts will foreclose standing under the "germaneness
prong."" Other courts have determined that the "individual participa-
tion prong" is the appropriate analytical tool with which to examine
whether an internal conflict of interest will prohibit associational
standing.12 However, among courts favoring Hunt's individual partici-
pation prong, some have found that internal conflicts of interest do
("RCPA P') (discussing the circuit split at length).
7 432 US 333 (1977).
8 Id at 343.
9 See, for example, Friends of the Earth, Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc,
528 US 167,181 (2000) (granting associational standing to a citizen organization suing under the
Clean Water Act); Arizonans for Official English v Arizona, 520 US 43, 65-66 (1997) (examining
associational standing of a group that sponsored a ballot initiative for an article of the state
constitution in a case regarding its constitutionality); United Food and Commercial Workers
Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517 US 544, 546, 552-53, 555-56 (1996) (granting
associational standing to union suing an employer for a violation of a law requiring advanced
notice of plant shutdown); Brock, 477 US at 282-88 (granting associational standing to a union in
a suit challenging the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of an employment statute).
10 See RCPA 1, 7 F3d at 600 ("While the Hunt test is well-established in our jurisprudence
and enjoys the specific reaffirmation of the Supreme Court ... the application of the various
prongs has, to this date, produced a caselaw that does not lend itself to easy distillation.").
11 See, for example, id at 605-07, discussing Maryland Highways Contractors Association,
933 F2d 1246.
12 See, for example, National Maritime Union, 824 F2d at 1231-32 (holding that even inter-
nal conflicts do not foreclose standing under the individual participation prong).
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not prohibit associational standing,'3 while others have found that cer-
tain internal conflicts would prohibit standing if the litigation was not
properly authorized by the members of the organization."
This Comment attempts to provide guidance in understanding
the myriad approaches to associational standing currently followed by
federal appellate courts. A simple two-part test can easily categorize
and fully explain the apparent chaos among the circuits. The proposed
solution requires formalizing the underlying reasoning of the lower
courts' analyses. The solution would require, as a first step, heightened
scrutiny of organizations with certain types of "profound" conflicts.
Then, in an examination under the germaneness prong, a court should
reject standing whenever a profound conflict negates the adversity re-
quired by the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the Consti-
tution. However, a court should grant associational standing if the or-
ganization can show that the litigation was adequately authorized by
its members because such a showing suffices to demonstrate sufficient
adversity. Profound conflicts also may require individual participation,
thus violating Hunt's individual participation prong, but courts should
seek other mechanisms to preserve dissenting members' rights.
Part I discusses the constitutional origins of the associational
standing doctrine. Part II analyzes the various problems and inconsis-
tencies of the approaches and discuss their theoretical underpinnings.
Finally, Part III recommends an easy-to-administer solution that for-
malizes the current lower courts' analyses, emphasizes how to mini-
mize constitutional concerns, and maximizes judicial efficiency.
I. THE ORIGINS OFTHE ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING DOCTRINE
This Part explores the foundations of the associational standing
doctrine. It examines how the constitutional underpinnings of the
standing doctrine limit a federal court's power to hear a case. Then it
analyzes the case law origins of the associational standing doctrine,
paying particular attention to the principles espoused in each Su-
preme Court opinion.
A. Article I Limits the Power of the Judiciary to Hear Cases
Article III restricts courts to hearing only cases and controver-
sies.'- However, the general phrasing of Article III allows for various
13 See, for example, id at 1231-34.
14 See, for example, Maryland Highways Contractors, 933 F2d at 1252-53 (holding that the
individual participation prong was not met when association filed suit because some members
would benefit from the litigation but others would suffer).
15 US ConstArt III, § 2, cl 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
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interpretations by courts.16 The minimal standing requirement of a
"case or controversy" has been interpreted to require that parties be-
fore the court have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.7
Traditionally, courts have interpreted the Article III standing doc-
trine to forbid the assertion of rights of third parties in order to pre-
serve the "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is-
sues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of diffi-
cult ... questions." 8 However, with the increasing complexity of litiga-
tion, courts have allowed alternate structures through which organiza-
tions or representatives may litigate on behalf of others.'9 An organiza-
tion may gain standing when it itself suffers a direct injuryno or it may
sue as the representative of its injured members.2' However, the "con-
crete adverseness" of the parties remains a critical issue in the devel-
opment of associational standing."
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority; ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controver-
sies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a state, or the Citizens thereof and foreign States,
Citizens, or Subjects.
16 See Haitian Refugee Center v Gracey, 809 F2d 794,798 (DC Cir 1987) ("It should be said
at the outset that the law of standing remains uncertain and unsettled in some of its major
branches.").
17 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61 (1992). In Lujan, the Supreme
Court articulated a three-part test that organizes the constitutional requirements for standing:
(1) the party must suffer an "injury in fact" which is concrete and particular and actual or immi-
nent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury must be traceable to the disputed action; and
(3) a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id.
18 Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83,99 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Baker v
Carr, 369 US 186,204 (1962).
19 The best-known example is that of class actions as described in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. See FRCP 23 (discussing prerequisites and procedures for filing class actions). For
a comparison of the associational standing doctrine to class actions, see International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v Brock, 477 US
274,291-92 (1986).
20 See Simon v Eastern Ky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 US 26,40 (1976) (denying wel-
fare organization standing because it did not allege an injury to itself).
21 See, for example, Hunt, 432 US at 341-43 (granting an advertisers' association standing
because it alleged injury to its members). See also Moore, 15 Moore's Federal Practice § 101.60 at
101-100 (cited in note 1) (noting that the organization does not have to assert a "personal stake"
because it can gain standing solely as the representative of its members).
22 The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed concern over the zealousness of litigants
in associational standing doctrine cases. See, for example, United Food and Commercial Workers
Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517 US 544, 557 (1996) ("[T]he entire doctrine of 'repre-
sentational standing,' of which the notion of 'associational standing' is only one strand, rests on
the premise that in certain circumstances, particular relationships (recognized either by com-
mon-law tradition or by statute) are sufficient to rebut the background presumption ... that liti-
gants may not assert the rights of absent third parties.") (citations omitted); Brock, 477 US at 297
(Powell dissenting) ("This Court has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to confer standing on
third parties for fear of inadequate representation.").
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B. The Associational Standing Doctrine Allows Organizations to
Assert the Rights of Their Members
The Supreme Court overcame the constitutional concerns regard-
ing third-party standing in a progression of cases in which the Court
found that an organization or association was a better party to bring
the litigation than were the original injured parties. The requirement
of sufficient adversity, which is an important aspect of associational
standing highlighted in the case law, will assist in explaining the impact
of internal conflicts of interest.
In its early cases, the Supreme Court focused on how organiza-
tions could gain standing to protect the rights of their members.
NAACP v Patterson2 was one of the first cases in which the Court held
that organizations could assert the rights of their members.24 In Patter-
son, the Court found that an organization could be the best party to
protect the rights of its members because the association and its
members "are in every practical sense identical.
' '
2 In Warth v Seldin,2
the Court acknowledged that organizations could gain associational
standing even in the absence of injury to the organizations them-
selves.2 The Court insisted, however, that in representing their mem-
bers, organizations must meet the constitutional case-or-controversy
requirement for the Court to have the power to hear the case.n The
Court held that a plaintiff might assert the rights of a third party if
"countervailing considerations" outweigh judicial reluctance to allow
one party to assert the claims of another.2 The Court also examined
how the prospective relief would benefit the members of the organiza-
tion!"
23 357 US 449 (1958).
24 Id at 458-60.
2 Id at 459. The Court granted representational standing to the NAACP when it sought to
assert the privacy rights of its members, calling the association "the medium through which its
individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views" Id.
26 422 US 490 (1975).
27 Id at 511, citing National Motor FreightAssociation v United States, 372 US 246 (1963).
28 Warth, 422 US at 501, citing United States v Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 US 669 (1973). This reasoning served as the basis for the first prong of the Hunt
test. See analysis in text accompanying note 33.
29 Warth, 422 US at 500-01. Specifically, the Court noted that the issue of standing involves
both constitutional case-or-controversy limitations on a federal court's jurisdiction and the
court's own circumspection in exercising its jurisdiction. Id at 498. Both of these prudential con-
siderations, the Court asserted, are founded on the "concern about the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." Id.
30 Id at 515. The Warth court stated:
[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf of
its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a
proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospec-
tive reliet it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the bene-
fit of those members of the association actually injured.
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The Supreme Court articulated the principle of associational
standing in Hunt. In this seminal case, an association of apple growers
sought to overturn a North Carolina statute that prohibited Washing-
ton State grade symbols on apple containers." The Court found that
the association had standing to represent the interests of its apple-
growing members and provided a three-prong test for lower courts to
apply in identifying organizations that are seeking associational stand-
ing.
Although the Supreme Court has never fully developed the con-
tours of any of the prongs, lower courts have considered the prongs'
underlying policies. The first, the members' standing prong, ensures
that part of the Article III case or controversy requirement is met by
requiring members to have suffered an injury in fact. 3 The second, the
germaneness prong, also examines the constitutional sufficiency of the
claim, by requiring an association to have a personal stake in the out-
come of the suit. This relationship between the organization's and
members' interests assures "concrete adverseness" by limiting the
type of interest for which the organization may sue' The third, the in-
dividual participation prong, seeks to ensure that the association will
be a better representative than individual members would be in pur-
suing litigation, thus improving judicial efficiency.
3 5
In International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America v Brock, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Hunt three-part test and explained the purpose and
policy of associational standing.7 The Court determined that associa-
tional representation provides tremendous advantages both to a court
and to an organization's members: "The only practical judicial policy
when people pool their capital, their interests, or their activities
Id at 515. This reasoning eventually developed into Hunt's third prong. See analysis in text ac-
companying notes 85-101.
31 432 US at 336-37.
32 Id at 343-45. See text accompanying note 8.
33 The Hunt Court quoted Warth for the proposition that "'[t]he Association must allege
that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of
the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members them-
selves brought the suit."' Hunt, 432 US at 342-43, quoting Warth, 422 US at 511.
34 United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517 US
544, 555-56 (1996) ("Hunt's second prong ... raises an assurance that the association's litigatQrs
will themselves have a stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as
the defendant's natural adversary," thus meeting the constitutional requirements for case or con-
troversy.).
35 See Vivian Weston Lathers, Comment, Associational Third-Party Standing and Federal
Jurisdiction under Hunt, 64 Iowa L Rev 121, 131-32 (1978) (analyzing the individual participa-
tion prong as ensuring that all proper parties are before the court), citing Hunt, 432 US at 344,
and Warth, 422 US at 515-16.
36 477 US 274 (1986).
37 Id at 288-90.
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under a name and form that will identify collective interests, often is
to permit the association or corporation in a single case to vindicate
the interests of all.' 'n The Court drew a distinction between the bene-
fits and requirements of class actions and associational standing.9 The
Court rejected the defendant's claim that members of an association
are served best by the class action provisions, which provide for spe-
cial guarantees of adequate representation.4° Instead, the Court found
that associational standing provides special advantages to both courts
and litigants.1
Organizations can draw upon a preexisting reservoir of expertise
and capital lacked by both individual plaintiffs and the ad hoc unions
created by class action groups.42 The Court stated that "the primary
reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehi-
cle for vindicating interests that they share with others."43 Moreover,
the special interest and expertise of a preexisting organization provide
the court with "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presen-
tation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumina-
tion of difficult ... questions."4 Again,4' the Court highlighted the im-
portance of sufficient advocacy in granting an organization represen-
tational standing.46 Importantly, each association possesses a self-
38 Id at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting JointAnti-Fascist Refugee Commit-
tee v McGrath, 341 US 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson concurring). See also 477 US at 290 ("[An]
association 'is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more
effective the expression of their views."'), quoting Patterson, 357 US at 459. See also National
Association of College Bookstores, Inc v Cambridge University Press, 990 F Supp 245, 251-52 (S
D NY 1997) (declaring that because "unanimity in organizations with thousands of members is
rarely possible," denying representational standing to organizations with internal conflicts of
interest "would clearly be inimical to the goals of judicial efficiency: It is precisely in cases where
large organizations are present that the greatest benefits are to be reaped by collective adjudica-
tion?'?). Brock, 477 US at 288-90.
40 Id. See also FRCP 23(a)(4) ("Prerequisites to a Clags Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if ... (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."). Although some courts
have suggested an additional prong to the Hunt test examining adequate representation, most
courts have rejected such a proposition. See Donald F. Simone, Note, Associational Standing and
Due Process: The Need for an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 BU L Rev 174,185 & nn 62-
65 (1981) (stating that some cases have examined the adequate representation issue, but "the
courts in these cases went beyond ... the language of the Hunt opinion"), discussing Associated
General Contractors of ND v Otter Tail Power Co, 611 F2d 684,691 (8th Cir 1979), and Local 194,
Retai4 Wholesale and Department Store Union v Standard Brands, Inc, 540 F2d 864, 867-88 (7th
Cir 1976).
41 Brock, 477 US at 289.
42 Id, citing Dale Gronemeier, Comment, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representa-
tives Litigating Their Members' Claims, 1974 U Ill L F 663,669.
43 Brock, 477 US at 290.
44 Id at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 205
(1962).
45 The importance of sufficient advocacy was also noted in Warth, 422 US at 500-01, 515.
See also text accompanying notes 26-30.
46 For a discussion of the relationship between sufficient advocacy and organizations with
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policing mechanism, which guarantees a modicum of fair representa-
tion. 7 The principles of associational standing outlined in Brock have
established the bedrock of interpretation for lower courts' application
of the Hunt test.4
II. APPLICATION OF THE ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING DOCTRINE TO
ORGANIZATIONS WITH INTERNAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Numerous courts have ruled on the standing of associations that
litigated on behalf of some of their members even though other mem-
bers of the organization opposed the litigation. In analyzing the stand-
ing of these potential parties, courts have consistently applied the
three-part test articulated in Hunt.' However, neither Hunt nor any of
the subsequent Supreme Court cases discussed how the test should
apply to organizations with internal conflicts of interest. 0 Conse-
quently, lower courts have struggled to apply the principles of Brock
and the three prongs of the Hunt test.5 '
Although all three prongs of the Hunt test technically must be
fulfilled in order to achieve associational standing, not all three are
implicated by an organization seeking associational standing. Beyond
finding that an organization does not have to have all of its members
injured,'2 courts have not focused on the first prong of the Hunt test
when affirming or denying associational standing for organizations
with internal conflicts of interest.'
Parts II.A and II.B will focus on the theoretical underpinnings
and the lower courts' apparent divergent applications of the germane-
ness and individual participation prongs, respectively.
internal conflicts of interest, see Part III.B.
47 Brock, 477 US at 290 ("The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an as-
sociation will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their inter-
ests."). This self-policing mechanism is typically enforced via the authorization procedures. See
Part III.B.3.
48 See, for example, notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
49 Hunt, 432 US at 343. See text accompanying note 8.
50 See note 9.
51 See note 10.
52 See Brock, 477 US at 284-85 (finding that association had standing because "many"
members were injured).
53 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 13 Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3531.9 at 613-14 (West 2d ed 1984) (noting a lack of judicial concern regarding
the first prong of the Hunt test-whether individual members can gain standing-in analyzing
the cases of organizations with internal conflicts of interest).
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A. Lower Courts Differ in Applying the Germaneness Prong to
Associations with Internal Conflicts of Interest
The second prong of the Hunt test requires that the organization
seek to protect interests that are "germane to the organization's pur-
pose."' In the ideal associational standing case, the association's litiga-
tion objectives would match both the strategy and goals of a single
member litigating individually 5 and the stated goals and purpose of
the organization's charter or constitution." Thus, when the litigation
does not clearly relate to the stated purpose of the organization, such
cases would be easily dismissed7 However, it is unclear how closely
the litigation and organization's purpose must align.
The Supreme Court has never clarified the limits to which the
litigation must be "germane to the organization's purpose."" Conse-
quently, the lower courts disagree as to how central the litigation must
be to the organization's purpose in order to grant organizational
standing. This Comment will first establish a basic understanding of
what is "germane to the organization's purpose," and then explore
how lower courts have applied these standards to organizations with
internal conflicts of interest.
1. The germaneness prong requires the subject of litigation to be
pertinent to the organization.
Courts agree that the benefits of associational standing described
in Brock"? will only be realized if the subject of the litigation is "central
to the purpose" of the organization. 6 However, no courts have de-
clared that the litigation itself must be the central purpose. Rather,
54 Hunt, 432 US at 343.
55 See NCAA v Califano, 622 F2d 1382, 1391 (10th Cir 1980) ("In the usual associational
standing case, what the association wants to achieve in the lawsuit is unquestionably what its
members want.").
56 Hunt, 432 US at 343.
57 Most of these types of cases never produce court decisions. For example, if the National
Rifle Association pursued litigation attempting to overturn minority contracting laws in public
schools, the court would dismiss it as outside the purpose of the organization.
58 See text accompanying notes 32-33.
59 Brock, 477 US at 288-90. See notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
60 See, for example, American Postal Workers Union v Frank, 968 F2d 1373, 1375 n 2 (1st
Cir 1992) (implying that the "central to the purpose" test was appropriately used by the district
court in denying standing); Peick v Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp, 724 F2d 1247,1259-60 (7th
Cir 1983) ("Associational standing is particularly appropriate when the association is seeking to
represent interests which are central to the purpose of the organization."); Associated General
Contractors of ND v Otter Tail Power Co, 611 F2d 684, 690-91 (8th Cir 1979) (holding that
associational standing was lacking because there was no showing of how the interests at issue
were "germane to the organization's purposes"). See also Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13 Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3531.9 at 614-17 (cited in note 53) ("Once the litigation ventures very
far from the central concerns of the organization, the[ ] assumption[ ]" that the organization will
represent the parallel interests of its members "simply cannot be indulged.").
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courts have provided lesser scrutiny examining the potential internal
conflict of interest when the litigation is clearly within the central pur-
pose of the organization.1
The typical meaning of "germane" is "relevant or pertinent."'
Most courts have focused on the latter definition and only require a
standard of "pertinence" between the litigation's subject matter and
the organization's purpose. This standard strikes a balance between
providing many of the benefits discussed in Brock and setting a high
enough bar to dissuade especially litigious organizations. Courts have
found that "[t]oo restrictive a reading of the [germaneness] require-
ment would undercut the interest of members who join an organiza-
tion in order to effectuate 'an effective vehicle for vindicating interests
that they share with others."'"" Consequently, the pertinence standard
allows a court to set a baseline to prevent organizations from litigating
and thereby "forcing the federal courts to resolve numerous issues as
to which the organizations enjoy little expertise and about which few
of their members demonstrably care."'4
2. Lower courts are divided over the application of the
germaneness prong.
Many courts have examined the second prong of the Hunt test in
determining the appropriate limits of germaneness to an organization,
but none has found that unanimity of membership is required, or that
any internal conflict of interest automatically forecloses associational
61 See, for example, Pennell v City of San Jose, 485 US 1, 7 n 3 (1988) (finding germaneness
prong fulfilled without thorough analysis because litigation fit squarely within the organization's
stated purpose).
62 Black's Law Dictionary 695 (West 7th ed 1999).
63 See, for example, Retired Chicago Police Association v City of Chicago ("RCPA 1'), 7
F3d 584, 607 (7th Cir 1993) (discussing the "pertinent" standard in determining whether an or-
ganization is representing the interests of members); Competitive Enterprise Institute v National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 901 F2d 107, 111-12 (DC Cir 1990) (stating that ger-
maneness is satisfied by a "mere pertinence"); Humane Society of the United States v Hodel, 840
F2d 45,56 (DC Cir 1988) (holding that the germaneness prong "require[s] only that an organiza-
tion's litigation goals be pertinent to its special expertise and the grounds that bring its member-
ship together"); American Insurance Association v Selby, 624 F Supp 267,271 (D DC 1985) ("An
association's litigation interests must be truly unrelated to its organizational objectives before a
court will declare that those interests are not germane."); MedicalAssociation of the State of Ala
v Schweiker, 554 F Supp 955, 965 (M D Ala 1983) (holding that in order to fulfill the germane-
ness prong, the litigation must have a "reasonable connection with the reasons the members
joined the organization and with the objectives of the organization"), affd, 714 F2d 107 (11th Cir
1983).
64 Hodel, 840 F2d at 56, quoting Brock, 477 US at 289-90. The Hodel court also recognized
that too loose a reading would allow an organization with an incredibly diverse membership to
challenge nearly any law and thus transform the organization into a "law firm seeking to sue in
its own name." 840 F2d at 57-58. For further discussion of the "roving law firm" concept, see note
119.
65 Hodel, 840 F2d at 57.
[69:351
2002] Associational Standing and Internal Conflicts of Interest 361
standing.' Because federal courts have limited power to hear cases,6'
courts have found that a lack of strong advocacy will prevent them
from hearing cases. An internal conflict of interest may prevent an
organization from being a zealous advocate because that organization
may not fully pursue litigation when the interests of some of its mem-
bers will be harmed by the litigation's success."'
In Sierra Club v Glickman,70 the Fifth Circuit articulated the most
lenient standard . The court granted the American Farm Bureau Fed-
eration standing to intervene on behalf of its members even though
not all of its members supported intervention.7 The Fifth Circuit did
not even require a majority of members to support the action, but
found instead that an organization has "standing to sue if only a few
members support it.""
Other courts have found that "profound" conflicts of interest
among the membership can prevent the litigation from being germane
to the organization's purpose. In two cases entitled Retired Chicago
Police Association v City of Chicago ("RCPA P"74 and "RCPA IT"'),
the Seventh Circuit identified two types of situations in which the con-
flicts are so "profound" that they would automatically violate the sec-
66 See, for example, Sierra Club v Glickman, 82 F3d 106, 110 (5th Cir 1996) (granting the
American Farm Bureau Federation representational standing to intervene as of right to protect
the rights of farmers even though not all members supported the intervention); National Asso-
ciation of College Bookstores Inc v Cambridge University Press, 990 F Supp 245, 251-52 (S D NY
1997) (granting standing while stating that "unanimity in organizations with thousands of mem-
bers is rarely possible").
67 See US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1. See also Part I.A.
68 See, for example, Retired Chicago Police Association v City of Chicago, 76 F3d 856,864-
66 (7th Cir 1996) ("RCPA Ir') ("[T]he fact that the litigation, if successful, would harm some
members' interests raises a concern that the association will not be fully committed to the litiga-
tion and, as a result, will not pursue the litigation with the zealous advocacy necessary to be an
adequate representative.").
69 See, for example, id. See also NCAA v Califano, 622 F2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir 1980)
("There is no 'case or controversy' here if unofficial contingents of the [organization] are seen
cheering both sides of the litigation, while governing bodies of the institutions sit as spectators
above the 'fight."); Mountain States Legal Foundation v Dole, 655 F Supp 1424, 1426 (D Utah
1987) ("Because associations typically consist of many members with potentially conflicting in-
terests and views on any particular dispute, a danger exists that certain members of the associa-
tion will be sympathetic to the adverse party. In such a case, there could be no legitimate contro-
versy.").
70 82 F3d 106 (5th Cir 1996).
71 Id at 110 (allowing standing when only a few of the association's members supported the
suit), citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc v Public Service Commission, 906 F2d 25,34 (1st Cir 1990).
Interestingly, Playboy does not support that proposition. Rather, Playboy, 906 F2d at 34, merely
concludes that Hunt does not require an injury to more than one member. No analysis of the liti-
gation's authorization occurs in Playboy.
72 Glickman, 82 F3d at 110 ("That all []members support intervention is not dispositive.").
73 Id.
74 7 F3d 584 (7th Cir 1993).
75 76 F3d 856 (7th Cir 1996).
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ond prong of the Hunt test. First, a profound conflict arises where an
association seeks standing to directly sue some of its own members."
Second, a profound conflict arises if the association did not properly
authorize the suit, and the litigation, if successful, would cause a direct
detriment to the interests of some of its members. The Seventh Cir-
cuit did not provide thorough explanations of why such profound con-
flicts violated Hunt's second prong, but simply stated that "[b]ecause
the interests which [the organization] seeks to protect by maintaining
this action do not reflect and are actually at odds with the interests of
some of its members, they certainly cannot be said to be 'germane' to
[the organization's] overriding purposes."
' '
In Polaroid Corp v Disney,8 the Third Circuit held that similarly
profound conflicts can prevent associational standing when a corpora-
tion seeks associational standing for its shareholders.1 In Polaroid, the
court found management to be an "uncertain representative for the
interests of the disadvantaged shareholders [in a tender offer], as it
may have an eye to protecting the interests of the majority.' The
court concluded that because the management was unable to serve
simultaneously as a vigorous advocate for the two opposing types of
shareholders, the management should not be granted standing.? In-
76 See RCPA .11,76 F3d at 864; RCPA 1,7 F3d at 606. See also notes 77-78 and accompany-
ing text.
77 RCPA 1, 7 F3d at 606, discussing Southwest Suburban Board of Realtors, Inc v Beverly
Area Planning Association, 830 F2d 1374, 1380-81 (7th Cir 1987) (denying standing because the
association would be suing "certain of its members on behalf of others of its members").
78 RCPA 1, 7 F3d at 606, discussing Maryland Highways Contractors Association, Inc v
Maryland, 933 F2d 1246 (4th Cir 1991) (denying standing because the suit would hurt minority
members and because the association failed to observe its own bylaws). See also RCPA II, 76
F3d at 864-65 (noting that finding a direct, detrimental effect may mean that the litigation will
not be germane to the association's purposes of helping its members, and that "the association
will not be fully committed to the litigation and, as a result, will not pursue the litigation with the
zealous advocacy necessary to be an adequate representative"). The Seventh Circuit identified a
potential third conflict-suing the management of the association. However, this situation essen-
tially is covered by the first scenario, in which an association sues one of its own members. See
Builders Association of Greater Chicago v City of Chicago, 170 FRD 435,439 n 3 (N D Ill 1996),
discussing RCPA 11, 76 F3d at 866.
79 RCPA 11, 76 F3d at 863. The court did note that authorization might aid in fulfilling the
second prong. Id at 865. See notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
80 862 F2d 987 (3d Cir 1998).
81 Id at 999-1000 (denying the management standing as a representative of its sharehold-
ers in a tender offer due to concerns over the adequacy of representation).
82 Id. For further analysis of Polaroid, see P. Michelle Grigsby, Note, Does a Target Corpo-
ration Have Standing to Sue Under the All Holders Rule? The Third Circuit Says No in Polaroid
Corp. v. Disney, 862 E2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988), 58 U Cin L Rev 717 (1989).
83 Polaroid, 862 F2d at 999, citing Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 194 (1976). and Singleton v
Wulff, 428 US 106,114 (1976) (Blackmun) (plurality). But see Deborah K. Rush, Comment, The
Third Circuit's Limitations on the Class of Plaintiffs Allowed to Assert Violations of the All Hold-
ers Rule: Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 E2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988), 68 Wash U L Q 415, 425-27 & nn
91, 94 (1990) (criticizing the limitation on standing and suggesting that suits for breaches of fidu-
ciary duty may be a more effective method for handling conflicts).
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deed, one basis for the constitutional requirement that a litigant have
a personal stake in the litigation is "to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues."' Part III of this
Comment will show that other courts have used the Seventh Circuit's
profound conflicts test but have not formally recognized that categori-
zation.
B. When Members Must Intervene, Standing Is Denied under the
Individual Participation Prong
Organizations seeking associational standing must also fulfill
Hunt's third prong: "neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the law-
suit."8 The Supreme Court has found that the individual participation
prong affects prudential rather than constitutional standing.6 How-
ever, courts have found that some internal conflicts of interest may
reduce judicial efficiency because the organization cannot effectively
assert a dissenting member's interests.s This section will first establish
a basic understanding of types of claims typically denied under the in-
dividual participation prong. Then it will explore how the lower courts
have applied these standards to organizations with internal conflicts.
1. Courts deny associational standing when individualized proof
is required.
Courts must examine both the "claim asserted" and the "relief
requested" when applying the third prong of the Hunt test.n In gen-
eral, courts have denied associational standing in litigation that re-
84 Polaroid, 862 F2d at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Simon v Eastern
Ky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 US 26,38 n 16 (1976), in turn quoting Baker v Carr, 369 US
186,204 (1962). Moreover, because the members of management may be individually harmed by
the success of the tender offer, they may not act in the best interests of the shareholders, and thus
would not be acting within the purpose of the organization. See Part II.B.4.
85 Hunt, 432 US at 343.
86 United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517 US
544,557 (1996) ("[T]he third prong of the associational standing test is best seen as focusing on
these matters of administrative convenience and efficiency, not on elements of a case or contro-
versy within the meaning of the Constitution."). Associational standing's original purpose was to
allow more effective advocates than individual litigants. See text accompanying notes 42-44. See,
for example, Brock, 477 US 274,275-76 (1986) ("[T]he doctrine of associational standing recog-
nizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle
for vindicating interests that they share with others."); Patterson, 357 US at 459 ("The Associa-
tion ... is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their own views.").
87 See, for example, National Association of College Bookstore Inc v Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 990 F Supp 245,248-52 (S D NY 1997) (granting standing to the association although
the suit would not be optimally efficient because of internal opposition).
88 Hunt, 432 US at 343 (phrasing the third prong of the test as, "neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit").
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quires individual participation.9 Courts have typically denied associa-
tional standing when the remedy requested includes damages because
individual participation is necessary in identifying the appropriate
levels of individual damages.9 When an association requests damages,
the damage claims are typically not shared by all members, and thus
require individualized participation. ' In this situation, the advantages
of associational standing are minimized: the organization is not the
best representative of any member's individual interest because the
organization is seeking to maximize the membership's total gain, per-
haps necessitating sacrifices from individual members.
The Supreme Court has also uniformly denied standing to or-
ganizations when elements of the claim require the individual partici-
pation of members. For example, in religious expression cases, indi-
viduals normally must participate to show the coercive effect of a gov-
ernment action.2 In these types of claims, the advantages of judicial ef-
ficiency created by associational standing" are reduced because indi-
vidual members would be forced to participate individually to prove
the elements of a claim.9
89 See Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.9 at n 144
(cited in note 53) (discussing cases applying individual participation prong).
90 See Telecommunications Research & Action Center v Allnet Communication Services
Inc, 806 F2d 1093,1094-95 (DC Cir 1986) ("[L]ower federal courts have consistently rejected as-
sociation assertions of standing to seek monetary, as distinguished from injunctive or declaratory,
relief on behalf of the organization's members.").
91 See, for example, Warth, 422 US at 490,515-16 ("[W]hatever injury may have been suf-
fered is peculiar to the individual member concerned and both the fact and extent of injury
would require individualized proof"). However, this prohibition against monetary damages is of
a prudential rather than a constitutional character, and thus may be allowed by statute or at a
court's discretion. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group,
Inc, 517 US 544, 554-58 (1996) (granting standing for union seeking back pay in employment
suit).
92 For example, in religious freedom cases, one element of the cause of action, showing the
coercive effect of government action, requires the individual participation of members. See Har-
ris v McRae, 448 US 297,321 (1986). Granting an association standing in such a case would vio-
late Hunt's third prong. Id (denying associational standing because free exercise violations re-
quire the showing of governmental action on an individual's free exercise claims); Board of Edu-
cation of Central School District No 1 v Allen, 392 US 236,248-49 (1968) (finding no free exer-
cise violation because plaintiffs failed to allege that the statute in question had coerced them as
individuals in the practice of their religion).
93 See Brock, 477 US at 288-90. See also text accompanying notes 38-47.
94 Associational standing has been denied under similar statutes requiring an individual-
ized showing of impact. See, for example, Rent Stabilization Association of the City of New York v
Dinkins, 5 F3d 591, 596-97 (2d Cir 1993) (denying standing to association of landlords seeking
only injunctive relief because city ordinance would require court to examine the details of each
particular instance of poor administration); Kansas Health Care Association, Inc v Kansas De-
partment of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 958 F2d 1018, 1022-23 (10th Cir 1992) (holding
that an association of nursing facilities lacked standing because determining what is an "ade-
quate" reimbursement rate would require the court to examine evidence particular to individual
providers).
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2. Lower courts are in conflict over the application of the
individual participation prong.
Various courts have applied Hunt's third prong to organizations
with internal conflicts of interest but have come to seemingly contra-
dictory results. Some circuits have found that conflicts of interest
within an organization do not violate IHunt's third prong, but then
courts grant associational standing under vastly different rationales.9
In contrast, two circuits held that an internal conflict of interest should
prohibit associational standing because affected dissenting members
will intervene to protect their individual interests.6
Courts granting associational standing have relied on numerous
rationales drawn from the Hunt analysis. The Ninth Circuit upheld an
associational standing claim under the individual participation prong
because the Supreme Court never inquired into whether the apple
growers and dealers represented by the Washington State Apple Ad-
vertising Commission in Hunt unanimously agreed to the suit. Other
courts have found that when a majority of the membership supports
the litigation and the organization has followed its internal proce-
dures, the internal conflict of interest does not prohibit associational
standing, even if a minority of members may be adversely affected.
For example, in Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc v
City of Philadelphia, an association of construction contractors had
standing to challenge the municipal ordinance that favored some of its
95 See Associated General Contractors of Ca4 Inc v Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F2d
1401, 1408-09 (9th Cir 1991) (granting associational standing without inquiring into unanimity of
membership; arguing that Supreme Court did not inquire in Hunt and that as a policy matter it is
not required); Contractors Association of Eastern Pa, Inc v City of Philadelphia, 945 F2d 1260,
1265-66 (3d Cir 1991) (granting associational standing in the face of conflicting interests because
the association represented the interests of the majority of its members); National Maritime Un-
ion of America, AFL-CIO v Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F2d 1228,1232-34 (DC
Cir 1987) (arguing that the Court in Hunt had said that associational standing is too valuable of a
tool to be abandoned because of conflicting interests and that the problem is best handled by the
internal procedures of the organization).
96 See, for example, Maryland Highways Contractors Association, Inc v Maryland, 933 F2d
1246, 1252-53 (4th Cir 1991) (denying standing because the association's members had "actual
conflicts of interest which would require that the individual members come into the lawsuit to
protect their interests"); Associated General Contractors of ND v Otter Tail Power Co, 611 F2d
684,691 (8th Cir 1979) (denying standing because actual and potential conflicts "require individ-
ual representation" of the association's members).
97 Associated General Contractors of Cal, 950 F2d at 1408-09, discussing Hunt, 432 US at
344, and Brock, 477 US at 287-90. Hunt, 432 US at 344, declared the third prong fulfilled because
"neither the interstate commerce claim nor the request for declaratory and injunctive relief re-
quires individualized proof and both are thus properly resolved in a group context." Similarly, in
Brock, 477 US at 287-90, the Court did not inquire into the unanimity of membership nor the ex-
istence of internal conflicts of interest.
98 945 F2d 1260 (3d Cir 1991).
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members over others because it had followed its own internal authori-
zation procedures, thus ensuring the adequacy of representation."
Courts denying associational standing under the individual
participation prong have found that some internal conflicts of interest
are so large that affected dissenting members will intervene to protect
their rights. ° Other circuits have found that even appropriate authori-
zation is insufficient to overcome concerns regarding the individual
participation prong.'°' Consequently, the circuit courts' analyses appar-ently rely on numerous different rationales.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Part II examined the apparent discord among the lower federal
courts concerning the effect of an internal conflict of interest on an
organization seeking associational standing. Part III will show that the
seeming disorder can be easily understood by examining how courts
have handled organizations with different intensities of internal con-
flicts of interest and internal authorization problems. Although courts
have proposed numerous reasons for accepting or denying associa-
tional standing,n an easily identifiable theme can be deduced from
examining the totality of the case law: courts have universally granted
standing to organizations that have minor internal conflicts, while
generally increasing the level of scrutiny under either the germane-
ness prong or the individual participation prong when examining pro-
found conflicts.
This Part proposes a test to formalize the underlying reasoning
that lower courts have applied in examining organizations with inter-
nal conflicts of interest. In applying the Hunt test, courts should first
determine what type of conflict exists. If the organization has a pro-
found conflict, then the court must provide greater scrutiny both un-
der the germaneness prong and under the individual participation
prong. The court must then determine if the germaneness prong's con-
cerns regarding sufficient constitutional adversity have been over-
come by adequate authorization. The court must also examine if indi-
99 Id at 1265-66.
100 See, for example, Maryland Highways Contractors, 933 F2d at 1252-53 ("[Tlhere are ac-
tual conflicts of interest which would require that the individual members come into the lawsuit
to protect their interests.").
101 See, for example, Associated General Contractors of ND, 611 F2d at 691. The court
noted:
The fact that the association voted unanimously to bring the lawsuit sheds little or no light
on the germaneness of the lawsuit to the organization's purpose. It is for the court, not the
members of the association, to determine whether their interests require individual repre-
sentation. Here, in view of the actual and potential conflicts, they clearly do.
102 See Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
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vidual participation significantly impairs judicial efficiency or if alter-
native mechanisms exist to preserve the considerable benefits of
associational standing.
To provide coherence to the lower courts' decisions, the underly-
ing rationales behind both the germaneness prong... and the individual
participation prong"4 must be analyzed and applied to organizations
with internal conflicts of interest. Part III.B demonstrates how courts
must examine how authorization affects constitutional adversity under
the germaneness prong. Part III.C shows that identification of a pro-
found conflict and its authorization can serve as a shorthand test to
determine whether judicial efficiency will be impaired under the indi-
vidual participation prong. Finally, Part III.D endorses alternative
measures for courts to handle organizations with profound conflicts
besides denying associational standing.
A. Courts Must Assess Whether the Organization Has a Profound
Internal Conflict of Interest
In analyzing whether to grant associational standing, courts must
first determine if the conflict is minor or profound. With a minor in-
ternal conflict of interest, members of the organization may dislike the
litigation, but have no vested interest in its outcome. Courts have
granted standing to organizations with these types of conflicts ' and
should continue to do so. However, many conflicts have impacts on
members that are more significant. The Seventh Circuit provides the
best categorization of these types of conflicts by defining as profound
conflicts those cases in which the organization is suing one of its own
members or in which litigation will "cause a direct detriment" to some
of the organization's members."6 Organizations with these types of
conflicts are sometimes granted and sometimes denied associational
standing.n
103 See Part II.A.1.
104 See Part II.B.1.
105 Most cases with minor internal conflicts of interest do not discuss them as relevant to
the associational standing doctrine. However, a few have recognized that minor conflicts exist
but are insignificant in the associational standing analysis. See, for example, Sierra Club v Glick-
man, 82 F3d 106,110 (5th Cir 1996) (granting the American Farm Bureau Federation representa-
tional standing to intervene as of right to protect the rights of farmers even though not all mem-
bers supported the intervention); National Association of College Bookstores, Inc v Cambridge
University Press, 990 F Supp 245,251 (S D NY 1997) ("[M]inor conflicts involving a small minor-
ity of an association's membership [are] immaterial to standing analysis.").
106 RCPA 11, 76 F3d at 864, discussing RCPA 1, 7 F3d at 606. See text accompanying notes
75-79.
107 See, for example, Contractors Association of Eastern Pa v City of Philadelphia, 945 F2d
1260,1266 (3d Cir 1991) (granting standing to construction association challenging constitution-
ality of minority set-aside ordinance because "there is nothing on this record indicating that [the
association] failed to follow [its] own internal rules before joining this litigation"); National
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B. Profound Conflicts Should Be Given Stricter Scrutiny under the
Germaneness Prong
After identifying a conflict as profound, the court should apply
strict scrutiny to determine if the conflict will threaten the basis of the
germaneness prong-the constitutional adversity of a case. Courts
have never found that the existence of a profound conflict automati-
cally prohibits standing. Rather, courts have claimed to examine nu-
merous factors to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the
claim.' ° However, this Comment proposes formalizing the underlying
analysis that courts have consistently used as a proxy to determine
constitutional sufficiency: whether the litigation was properly author-
ized.' W The proposed test requires courts to apply the additional crite-
rion of proper authorization when evaluating the germaneness prong11
because of the potential for a bare majority or influential minorities to
commandeer the litigation process."'
1. Profound conflicts can threaten constitutional adversity.
An organization with a profound internal conflict may yield to
pressures from dissenting members and alter its litigation strategy. The
conflict could disrupt the organization and diminish the zealousness
Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F2d 1228,
1232-34 (DC Cir 1987) (denying standing to union representing both workers who would be
helped by a successful challenge of award of government contract and workers who would be in-
jured by a successful challenge).
108 See Part II.A.2.
109 Although no definition of "proper authorization" has been formally adopted, each court
seems to undertake a particularized analysis focusing on numerous issues, such as: (1) authoriza-
tion according to the organization's own procedures (see, for example, RCPA II, 76 F3d at 865
(identifying the importance of procedures in assuring membership approval) and Contractors
Association of Eastern Pa, 945 F2d at 1265-66 (granting standing in part because "there is noth-
ing on this record indicating that [the association) failed to follow [its] own internal rules before
joining this litigation")); (2) notifying the membership of the litigation (see, for example, Mary-
land Highways Contractors Association, Inc v Maryland, 933 F2d 1246, 1253 (4th Cir 1991) (not-
ing in denying standing that "the Board took the unusual position of not telling the members of
its decision to litigate until after the suit had already been filed")); (3) receiving the endorsement
of the membership (see, for example, Associated General Contractors of Cal, Inc v Coalition for
Economic Equity, 950 F2d 1401, 1409 (9th Cir 1991) (urging that associational standing be
granted whenever the litigation has the "clear mandate of the association represented")).
110 The party seeking associational standing should bear the burden of showing that the
procedure was properly authorized. See RCPA 11, 76 F3d at 865. An organization bears the bur-
den of proving that it meets the required elements of standing. Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504
US 555, 561 (1992). These elements include following the appropriate authorization procedures.
111 A court must examine conflicted organizations with greater scrutiny because of the con-
cern that they will be less zealous and thus inadequately represent their members' interests. See
Brock, 477 US at 289 ("[T]he litigation strategy selected by the association might reflect the
views of only a bare majority-or even an influential minority-of the full membership.");
Simone, Note, 61 BU L Rev at 179-81 (cited in note 40) (discussing possibilities of inadequate
representation when associations seek standing).
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with which the organization pursues the litigation, 2 perhaps even to
the point of failing the constitutional threshold of case or contro-
versy.1'3 Consequently, a court could find that an organization is not
the most effective advocate, and that litigation may be pursued more
effectively on an individual level.
114
2. Authorization can cure the constitutional adversity problems
inherent even in organizations without internal conflicts
of interest.
Appropriate authorization of the litigation may have a significant
impact on a court's decision to grant standing to any organization
seeking to represent the interests of its members. Courts have denied
standing to organizations-even to those without any internal con-
flicts of interest-if they failed to follow authorization or notification
procedures."5 Consequently, courts have extensively examined the im-
pact of adequate authorization on the germaneness and individual
participation prongs for organizations with internal conflicts of inter-
est. Legitimate authorization will ensure the membership's support of
the litigation, and thus vitiate any constitutional concerns encountered
in applying the germaneness prong.
3. Authorization can help ensure constitutional adversity by
increasing the zealousness of advocacy.
Although courts have espoused many reasons for approving or
disapproving associational standing, their analyses under the ger-
inaneness prong often turn on the effects of authorization on constitu-S 116
tional adversity. Authorization ensures that the litigation as a whole
112 See RCPA I1,76 F3d at 865.
113 See text accompanying notes 15-22.
114 The problem of zealous advocacy may be diminished by appropriate authorization. See
RCPA 1, 76 F3d at 865. See also Part III.B.3.
115 See, for example, Local 194, Retai4 Wholesale and Department Store Union v Standard
Brands, Inc, 540 F2d 864,867-68 (7th Cir 1976) (suggesting that a provision should be added for
notice to individual members so that those who choose not to be represented by the union may
make other arrangements); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v EPA, 507 F2d 905, 908-11
& n 6 (9th Cir 1974) (denying standing to the NRDC because the litigation was not approved by
or authorized by affected members).
116 Only one court has incorrectly reasoned that courts should independently determine
whether they have the authority to hear the case. See Associated General Contractors of ND v
Otter Tail Power Co, 611 F2d 684,691 (8th Cir 1979) (finding that the unanimous approval of the
litigation by members "sheds little or no light on the germaneness of the lawsuit to the organiza-
tion's purpose"). Most courts disagree with the Eighth Circuit and find that authorization aids in
assuring zealous advocacy to meet the constitutional requirement of case or controversy. See, for
example, RPCA II, 76 F3d at 865 (explaining that whenever litigation is "authorized in accor-
dance with the association's procedures ... the membership has affirmed that the detriment to
some members' interests does not render the litigation outside the germane interests of [the] as-
The University of Chicago Law Review [69:351
falls within the scope of legitimate association action because proper
authorization indicates the membership's collective will to support the
litigation. With authorization, the membership has affirmed that the
detriment to some members' interests does not render the litigation
outside the interests of the association."' Such circumstances should
assure courts that the association will pursue the litigation with the
strong advocacy and persistence necessary to be an effective represen-
tative."8 Consequently, an organization approving the litigation
through the proper authorization procedures would fulfill the ger-
maneness prong.' Since most litigation is properly approved, most or-
ganizations with internal conflicts of interest would satisfy the ger-
inaneness prong and would be able to gain standing/'°
sociation, assur[ing] that [it] will pursue the litigation with the strong advocacy and persistence
necessary to be an effective representative"). Simply assuring that the litigation was authorized
does not solve all possible concerns a court may encounter when applying the Hunt test. For ex-
ample, a profound conflict problem could still create problems under the individual participation
prong. See Part III.B.4.
117 RCPA 11, 76 F3d at 865. See note 116.
118 See Builders Association of Greater Chicago v City of Chicago, 170 FRD 435,439 (N D
Ill 1996) ("When the litigation has been properly authorized, there is less concern that the rights
of dissenting members will be compromised or that the association will not provide the 'zealous
advocacy necessary to be an adequate representative."'), quoting RCPA 11, 76 F3d at 865.
119 See, for example, Contractors Association of Eastern Pa v City of Philadelphia, 945 F2d
1260, 1265-66 (3d Cir 1991) (granting standing in part because "there is nothing on this record
indicating that [the association] failed to follow [its] own internal rules before joining this litiga-
tion"); Associated General Contractors of Conn, Inc v City of New Haven, 130 FRD 4, 10 (D
Conn 1990) ("Unanimity among AGC's members is not a requirement for its standing. Resolu-
tion of frictions within AGC's membership is a matter of its governance. As long as the suit is not
in contravention of its purposes nor its by-laws which govern its decision making process, it has
standing."). Some concerns remain about an organization that attempts to become a "roving law
firm with standing" for any particular-interest case. This organization could structure itself so
that it could easily alter its constitution to meet the pertinence standard for each case it brings
without strong support for the litigation from the membership. However, in such circumstances,
Hunt's first prong still requires an organization seeking standing to meet the Lujan requirements
of particularized injury. See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61 (1992); Humane
Society of the United States v Hodel, 840 F2d 45,56 n 16 (DC Cir 1988) ("[T]he independent first
prong of the Hunt test ., . would of course provide a significant check on renegade leaders of liti-
gious associations."). See also note 17. If the organization is large enough to encompass many in-
dividuals so that a single member is likely to have an injury for any given litigation (for example,
a national political party with tens of millions of members), the organization will likely also have
a member who would be on the opposite side of the litigation. Thus, associational standing would
be denied under the individual participation prong. Moreover, courts have not expressed serious
concern over granting associational standing to organizations created specifically for the purpose
of litigation. See, for example, Pennell v City of San Jose, 485 US 1, 7 n 3 (1988) (finding the ger-
inaneness prong fulfilled because the association claimed to be "'organized for the purpose of
representing the interests of the owners and lessors of real property' in San Jose in this lawsuit")
(citation omitted).
120 Conflicts should be examined under the individual participation prong. See Part III.C.
Some litigation may be properly approved but still fail the mere pertinence standard of the ger-
maneness prong. See note 62.
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4. Some conflicts may cause an association to fail the
requirement of constitutional adversity even when the
litigation is properly authorized.
Proper authorization will not necessarily solve all of the constitu-
tional concerns regarding a court's jurisdiction. In some situations,
those who control the approval and direction of the litigation may
have an individual stake in the litigation (besides their representative
capacity) that could directly conflict with the interests of the rest of
the membership. 121 In these types of situations, even if the litigation has
been appropriately approved, the court should deny standing because
of the potential for inadequate representation. However, these situa-
tions occur quite infrequently and only when the authorization and
representation functions are merged."
Proper authorization provides numerous benefits in ensuring that
an association meets the constitutional requirements for standing. Be-
cause profound conflicts can undermine the adversity required to
meet the Article III case-or-controversy requirement, proper authori-
zation can ensure that the organization as a whole supports the litiga-
tion and thus will zealously pursue the litigation. However, a few or-
ganizations, ones whose representative and authorization functions
are merged, will be incapable of zealously advocating for minority in-
terests, and thus should be barred from gaining associational standing.
C. Conflicts of Interest Should Be Examined under the Individual
Participation Prong
The proposed test also requires heightened scrutiny under the in-
dividual participation prong whenever a profound conflict exists. In-
ternal conflicts of interest may require individuals to intervene to pro-
tect their interests, thus violating the third prong of the Hunt test.n
This Comment proposes adopting the profound conflicts test124 as an
initial screening device to identify situations in which dissenting mem-
bers are likely to intervene to protect their rights: when the organiza-
121 These situations occur in cases in which the management's future livelihood directly
conflicts with the financial interests of the membership. See, for example, Polaroid, 862 F2d at
999-1000 ("While shareholders ... have a reason to react favorably to many tender offers, those
in control of the target corporation have a natural incentive to resist a corporate takeover [be-
cause they] may suffer a substantial loss in future earnings if the tender offer is successful."). For
further discussion of Polaroid, see text accompanying notes 81-84.
122 This situation occurred only once in the more than forty cases examined-in Polaroid.
See note 121. The presence of such a conflict may have resulted from the unusual entity that
sought associational standing (a corporation). Typical plaintiffs, business associations or unions,
usually do not possess these unique types of conflicted interests.
123 See Hunt, 432 US at 343 ("[N]either the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.") (emphasis added).
124 See text accompanying notes 74-78.
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tion is suing one of its own members and when success of the litigation
will cause a direct detriment to a member. Thus, the profound conflicts
test, originally used in RCPA II to examine constitutional adversity,
effectively identifies areas that may require individual participation,
and thus would require heightened scrutiny.
1. The profound conflicts test should identify situations in which
members will intervene to protect their interests.
Associational standing provides tremendous benefits not only for
an organization's members,2  but also for the judiciary.'2 Indeed,
Hunt's third prong appears primarily concerned with increasing judi-
cial efficiency. '  Under the individual participation prong, the pro-
found conflicts test serves as a shortcut in determining when individ-
ual members will be required to intervene to protect their interests.
This shortcut ensures one of the primary purposes of associational
standing identified in Brock: an efficient adjudication of common
claims without the formalities of a class action proceeding.2 The Su-
preme Court observed in Brock that "the doctrine of associational
standing recognizes that the primary reason people join an organiza-
tion is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that
they share with others."'28 Individuals become members of organiza-
tions and contribute financial resources, political support, or time for
the express purpose of furthering a common goal.'3' The proposed test
would require courts to examine closely whether the two types of pro-
found conflicts require the individual participation of dissenting
members.
Many "direct detriment" conflicts will require individual partici-
pation. In some situations, successful litigation will result in the loss of
statutory benefits for dissenting members' 2-when the statute is over-
125 See RCPA II,76 F3d at 863-66.
126 These benefits include the organization's greater resources and expertise in the subject
matter as well as the organization's role in overcoming the collective action problem of its mem-
bers. See Brock, 477 US at 288-90. See also text accompanying notes 38-43.
127 See Brock, 477 US at 288-90. See also text accompanying notes 38-43.
128 See United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517 US
544, 557 (1996) ("[Ihe third prong of the associational standing test is best seen as focusing on
these matters of administrative convenience and efficiency, not on elements of a case or contro-
versy within the meaning of the Constitution."). See also text accompanying note 35.
129 See 477 US at 288-90. See also Part I.B.
130 477 US at 290.
131 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v McGrath, 341 US 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson
dissenting) ("[P]eople pool their capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form
that will identify collective interests.").
132 See, for example, Maryland Highways Contractors Association, Inc v Maryland, 933 F2d
1246,1252-53 (4th Cir 1991) (denying standing to an association of contractors challenging a mi-
nority business enterprise statute because some of its members would benefit from the contin-
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turned these individuals are effectively denied any potential recourse.
Theoretically, individual members could attempt to pressure the legis-
lature to enact similar benefits. However, the likelihood of success of
such an effort is effectively zero. Members who currently benefit from
the statute consequently must present their legal arguments during
the litigation through intervention or lose any chance of preserving
their benefits.
In other direct detriment cases, successful litigation will not
automatically deny any form of relief to dissenting members, but in-
stead will force such members to litigate on their own behalf.M How-
ever, these dissenting members will face additional burdens resulting
from the association's actions: 1) some courts may find that the dis-
senting member and the organization share such a unity of facts and
interest that the litigant would be precluded from a collateral attack
upon the judgment;m or 2) individuals may be hampered by the stare
decisis effect of the litigation." Thus, many direct-detriment conflicts
would seem to result in a denial of associational standing because
heightened scrutiny under the individual participation prong will show
that individual members must participate in order for their interests to
be adequately represented. However, courts can and should find al-
ternate methods to preserve dissenting members' interests while still
granting standing to the organization. '
The other profound conflict-the "suing one's own" conflict t -
also automatically requires individual participation. A member who is
sued is a necessary party to the litigationn and must participate in or-
ued enforcement of the statute while others would benefit if the law were declared unconstitu-
tional).
133 See, for example, National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v Commander, Mili-
tary Sealift Command, 824 F2d 1228, 1233-34 (DC Cir 1987) (holding that unions representing
employees of unsuccessful bidders for government contracts need not be denied standing to
challenge award of contract simply because individual dissenting members may decide to inter-
vene).
134 Courts will apply the doctrine of res judicata and preclude a subsequent claim when: (1)
the first judgment was final and on the merits; (2) the prior action involved the same parties or
their privies; and (3) the prior action involved essentially the same claim. James Win. Moore, 18
Moore's Federal Practice § 131.01 at 131-11 to 131-12 (Matthew Bender 3d ed 2001).
135 A court will not automatically preclude a dissenting member from relitigating because
there may not be a unity of facts and interests. However, the stare decisis effect will likely insu-
late the defendant from future collateral attacks. Although a previous ruling will not bind a dis-
senting member, the precedential effect provides an additional hurdle for an individual member
seeking to validate a claim. See Chicago-Midwest Meat Association v City of Evanston, 589 F2d
278, 280-81 & n 3 (7th Cir 1978) ("The stare decisis effect of our decision provides the defen-
dants with substantial protection against further litigation.").
136 See Part II.D.
137 The first category of profound conflict is identified in RCPA 11, 76 F3d at 864. See also
note 124.
138 See FRCP 19 (discussing further ideas regarding necessary and indispensable parties,
without whom a suit may not proceed).
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der to protect her own rights and respond to any claims brought
against her. Consequently, courts should deny associational standing
to any organization that is suing one of its own members.'39
Minor conflicts outside these two categories will not be a bar un-
der this proposed solution. Because only profound conflicts receive
heightened scrutiny, organizations with conflicts that do not reach that
level will be granted associational standing. Regardless of the judicial
theory supposedly relied upon, courts have consistently granted asso-
ciational standing for organizations that have minor conflicts falling
outside the two types of profound conflicts.' ° Minor conflicts should
not prevent associational standing because granting such power to
"remote interests of discrete members would seriously undermine the
ability of individuals through organizations to achieve public interest
objectives through the legal system.' 4'
2. Courts should examine the litigation's authorization process
in order to aid judicial efficiency.
The proposed solution recognizes that an organization cannot be
a single monolithic entity with complete unanimity of interests. All as-
sociations will have some conflicts,'4 2 especially since most are formed
around broad purposes.'43 As a result, "because internal conflicts are
endemic to associations, members expect to incur certain costs to their
own interests upon joining.'"4 Members are willing to sacrifice a por-
139 This doctrine can be extended to similar situations, such as when an organization sues its
own management. See, for example, RCPA II, 73 F3d at 866 (noting that the suing-one's-own
conflict arose when the RCPA claimed that one of its own officers breached his fiduciary duty).
140 See, for example, Gillis v United States Department of Health and Human Services, 759
F2d 565,572-73 (6th Cir 1985) (granting an association standing to challenge a hospital's failure
to fulfill statutory obligations because the negative impact of successful litigation on association
members was "both speculative and indirect"). See also National Constructors Association v Na-
tional Electrical Contractors Association, Inc, 498 F Supp 510, 521-22 (D Md 1980) (approving
associational standing, although the organization had a diversity of interests, because the litiga-
tion was not "work [ing] against [any] member's interest").
141 Gillis, 759 F2d at 572-73.
142 See, for example, National Association of College Bookstores, Inc v Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 990 F Supp 245,251-52 (S D NY 1997) ("[U]nanimity in organizations with thousands
of members is rarely possible.").
143 See Associated General Contractors of Cal, Inc v Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F2d
1401, 1409 (9th Cir 1991) ("Unanimous opinions within an organization's membership will be
few and far between with regard to most issues controversial enough to engender litigation.").
144 National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v Commander, Military Sealift Com-
mand, 824 F2d 1228,1233-34 (DC Cir 1987).The case states:
Most, or perhaps all, associations, even though created to serve the members' common in-
terests, will have internal conflicts about appropriate organizational policies. Such conflicts
are typically resolved by the association's internal procedures or political structure. Inevita-
bly, some resolutions will harm some members' interests, but that is usually accepted as part
of the cost of obtaining the benefits of association. Courts would ordinarily uphold an asso-
ciation's determinations against internal challenge unless it were shown that the organiza-
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tion of their individual interests to achieve a greater common objec-
tive. Consequently, this Comment recommends taking advantage of
the self-policing mechanism identified in Brock that helps to assure
that organizations only pursue actions favorable to the entire organi-
zation." This process, exemplified by appropriate authorization,' '  en-
sures that the organization has evaluated the litigation and deter-
mined that pursuing the litigation will further the organization's goals,
even if individual members will be injured."
Courts should grant standing to an organization only when the
organization has properly approved the litigation. Otherwise, indi-
viduals would be unable to "create an effective vehicle for vindicating
interests that they share with others."' All of the interested members
would be forced to litigate the problem individually, requiring the
courts to hear multiple cases and thus drastically reducing judicial ef-
ficiency. ' Given the Supreme Court's espoused preference for asso-
ciational standing and its importance as a mechanism for litigating in-
dividual members' claims,IS courts should not lightly deny associa-
tional standing even when there is a profound conflict that requires
individual participation.
tion's own procedures had been violated. It is not obvious to us that this rationale should
not apply to an association's internal resolution of conflicts about litigating positions.
Id.
145 See Brock, 477 US at 290 ("The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an
association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their
interests.").
146 See Part III.B.
147 See Humane Society of the United States v Hodel, 840 F2d 45,56 (DC Cir 1988), quoting
Brock, 477 US at 290:
The third "special feature" of associations cited in [Brock], their self-policing character,
would seem to carry particular force on the germaneness issue. If the "forces that cause in-
dividuals to band together" guarantee some degree of fair representation, they surely guar-
antee as well that associational policymakers will not run roughshod over the strongly held
views of association members in fashioning litigation goals.
Obviously some concern exists regarding influential minorities commandeering the approval
process. However, these concerns can be allayed via traditional organizational remedies, such as
actions for breach of fiduciary duty or violation of an organization's charter. See text accompa-
nying note 158.
148 Brock, 477 US at 290.
149 See National Association of College Bookstores, 990 F Supp at 248-52 (stating that deny-
ing representational standing to an organization with an internal conflict of interest "would
clearly be inimical to the goals of judicial efficiency: It is precisely in cases where large organiza-
tions are present that the greatest benefits are to be reaped by collective adjudication.").
150 See Brock, 477 US at 288-90 (discussing the strengths of associational standing and its
importance for the just adjudication of claims). See also text accompanying notes 38-47.
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D. Courts Should Preserve Dissenting Members' Rights through
Less Drastic Measures than Denial of Standing
The proposed test requires heightened scrutiny to determine
when profound conflicts diminish constitutional adversity or reduce
judicial efficiency under Hunt's second and third prongs, but it also
requires courts to dismiss standing claims only in extreme circum-
stances. In light of the tremendous benefits derived from associational
standing,'' courts should explore whatever means possible to allow as-
sociational standing. '2
However, in some situations, a court may find that the unique
combination of circumstances makes alternative mechanisms unwork-
able and that a party is "indispensable" to the litigation."3 The court
should deny associational standing to the organization in such a case
because the dissenting member is "required" to participate in the liti-
gation, thus violating Hunt's third prong."" Eventually, the suit could
be filed again, but interested individuals who bring the suit would lack
the expertise and resources of the original organization."
Before dismissal, courts should examine any alternative mecha-
nisms of preserving dissenting members' rights. The proposed test in-
corporates the methods by which numerous courts have taken into ac-
count dissenters' interests:
1) by liberally approving of dissenting members' intervention in
the lawsuit to a) protect their rights or b) show that authorization
procedures were violated and that associational standing should
therefore be denied; 56
2) by allowing subsequent claims by dissenting members;'" or
151 See Brock, 477 US at 288-90. See also text accompanying notes 38-47.
152 See, for example, Builders Association of Greater Chicago v City of Chicago, 170 FRD
435,438-39 (N D Ill 1996) (noting "'less drastic ways' to protect the rights of dissenting members
of an association than denying associational standing"), quoting Brock, 477 US at 290.
153 See James Wm. Moore, 4 Moore's Federal Practice §§ 19.03-19.06 at 19-33 to 19-114
(Matthew Bender 3d ed 2001) (discussing the contours of "indispensable" parties under FRCP
19 and recommending "fact-specific" determination of parties necessary to litigation).
154 See Hunt, 432 US at 343. See also text accompanying note 8. For discussion of such ex-
amples, see Part III.C.1.
155 See Brock, 477 US at 288-90. See also text accompanying notes 42-43.
156 See, for example, Associated General Contractors of California, Inc v Coalition for Eco-
nomic Equity, 950 F2d 1401,1408-09 (9th Cir 1991) (holding that dissenters' interests "should be
taken into account ... through liberal approval of intervention"); National Maritime Union of
America, AFL-CIO v Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F2d 1228, 1233-34 (DC Cir
1987) (suggesting that individual members "could intervene to advance their interests [or] chal-
lenge the association's standing").
157 See, for example, Associated General Contractors of Cal, 950 F2d at 1408-09 ("[T]he in-
terests of [ ] dissenters should be taken into account ... through refusal to preclude subsequent
claims by dissenting members."); National Maritime Union, 824 F2d at 1233 n 9 ("Members ad-
versely affected by an association's litigation victory might be able to relitigate the claim on
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3) by allowing subsequent actions seeking compensation for
misbehavior of the organization.n
Each of these remedies would allow individual dissenting mem-
bers to protect their interests but would not require the dismissal of
what the Supreme Court has described as "the special features [of as-
sociational standing], advantageous both to the individuals repre-
sented and to the judicial system as a whole.""' 9
CONCLUSION
Associational standing enhances judicial efficiency and helps se-
cure the just administration of members' rights. However, the internal
conflicts of an organization initially appear to violate several prongs
of the Supreme Court's test to ensure constitutional standing and ef-
fective representation. The confusing lower court analyses can be
clarified by a multi-part test examining the authorization process of
profound conflicts to determine if sufficient constitutional adversity
exists. A court should only dismiss based on a lack of associational
standing when a conflict is so profound that it requires dissenting
members to intervene to protect their rights-either because they are
being sued or because the litigation will cause a direct detriment to
their interests. Even then, courts will best fulfill the Court's desired ef-
ficient advocacy by seeking to preserve the rights of dissenting mem-
bers through other avenues. In summary, courts must consider the
tremendous benefits of associational standing and seek alternative
mechanisms to preserve this valuable tool for both an organization's
members and the courts.
which the association prevailed without operation of preclusion principles, i.e., res judicata or
collateral estoppel"); Associated General Contractors of Conn, Inc v City of New Haven, 130
FRD 4,10 (D Conn 1990) ("[A] judgment won against an association might not preclude subse-
quent claims by members where an association is deficient in representation'), citing Brock, 477
US at 290. Some commentators suggest that preclusion is not a viable solution to problems of
adequate representation. See, for example, Simone, Note, 61 BU L Rev at 185-87 (cited in note
40) (noting that courts seldom use an adequate scrutiny standard when precluding subsequent
litigation). However, a court will not automatically preclude a dissenting member from initiating
a future claim because there may not be a unity of facts and interests. See note 134 and accom-
panying text. Rather, stare decisis will probably insulate the defendant from future collateral at-
tacks but will not bind a dissenting member who has a strong case to overturn the judgment. See
Chicago-Midwest Meat Association v City of Evanston, 589 F2d 278,280-81 & n 3 (7th Cir 1978).
See also note 135.
158 See, for example, National Maritime Union, 824 F2d at 1233 n 9 (discussing possible
"cause[s] of action arising therefrom for breach of fiduciary duty or of the organization's by-laws,
charter or governing statutes against those who initiated the suit").
159 Brock, 477 US at 289.

